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Abstract
Generic technology in industry cluster refers to the 
widely used technology in pre-competitive stage in 
industry cluster and it plays a decisive role in the survival, 
advancement and development of the industry cluster. 
It possesses such characteristics as basic, advanced, 
sharing, risk, positive externality, and it is microcosmic 
and applicable. And the Research and development and 
diffusion of generic technology in industry cluster exert 
positive influence on the development of the enterprises 
in industry cluster, the whole cluster as well as regional 
economy. Therefore, this paper attempts to make a 
dynamic game analysis on the behaviors of companies 
during the diffusion of generic technology in industry 
cluster under the mode of market supply, and gives advice 
on the promotion of the research and development and 
diffusion of generic technology in cluster.
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INTRODUCTION
Generic technology, used in various kinds of industries 
and regions, will not only promote the economic and 
social development, but also exert positive influence on 
the advancement and development of a country’s industry 
technology. China has paid great emphasis on generic 
technology. On October 18th 2010, the State Council of 
china had published a document called “Decision on 
Accelerating the Development and Cultivation of New 
Industries”, indicating that our country would concentrate 
on developing some significant generic technology, 
combined with the implements of  the Country Scientific 
and Technological Program, Knowledge Innovation 
Projects and Natural Science Foundation. The research and 
development and diffusion of generic technology advance 
the development of industry cluster. Industry cluster in 
turn further stimulates the development and innovation 
of generic technology. The research and development 
and diffusion of generic technology in industry cluster 
impulse the technological innovation and the upgrade of 
industry structure as well as the competitiveness of the 
area. Meanwhile, industry cluster provides an important 
platform for the diffusion of generic technology.
At present, the research and development of generic 
technology in industry cluster focus on the innovation, 
supply, research and development of generic technology 
as well as the selection of key generic technologies. LI 
Jizhen (2006) said that generic technology had four 
characteristics, that were, basic, openness, externality 
and relevance. YU Xijun (2006) maintained that regional 
scientific and technological innovation service center, 
research and development center of key companies 
and research and development institute of prestigious 
universities constituted innovative carrier of generic 
technology. ZENG Fanying(2009)had studied on the 
supply mode of research and development of generic 
technology in industry cluster, and found that there were 
three types, including government supply mode, market 
supply mode and organizational supply mode. Market 
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mode referred to the situation that those companies with 
independent property in the industry cluster made full use 
of various kinds of resource to make research and to gain 
profits by selling its research findings to other companies 
in the industry cluster. WEI Zhuhong (2009) studied the 
cooperative way of innovation of generic technology in 
industry cluster in his master degree paper. ZHOU Qiao 
(2010) deemed that the diffusion of generic technology in 
industry cluster was the popularization of the innovative 
generic technology through the proper channel.
The studies above demonstrate that scholars have 
recognized the importance of the diffusion of generic 
technology in industry cluster. Their research findings 
have laid a solid foundation in research and development 
and enriched theories on generic technology in industry 
cluster. However, the diffusion of generic technology 
in industry cluster entails further research. With the 
development and improvement of the technology 
market, providing generic technology the industry 
cluster needed through market becomes the direction 
of future development. Therefore, this paper attempts 
to make a dynamic game analysis on the behaviors of 
companies during the diffusion of generic technology 
in industry cluster under the mode of market supply, 
which contributes to the effective spread and absorb of 
the generic technology for companies in industry cluster, 
putting forward of appropriate policies to enhance the 
development of generic technology in industry cluster, 
and the overall economic development of the industry and 
the whole region.
1 .   D Y N A M I C  A N A LY S I S  O N  T H E 
DIFFUSION OF GENERIC TECHNOLOGY 
IN INDUSTRY CLUSTER
Generic technology in industry cluster refers to the 
widely used technology in pre-competitive stage in 
industry cluster and it plays a decisive role in the survival, 
advancement and development of the industry cluster. 
Generic technology in industry has characteristics like 
general generic technology (basic, advanced, sharing, 
risk, positive externality). In addition, it possesses 
two particular characteristics. On the one hand, it 
is microcosmic, which means this kind of generic 
technology is not at the national level, but at a particular 
level of regional industry cluster. On the other hand, 
it is applicable, mainly addressing the generic applied 
technology influencing and leading economic and 
technological progress of the industry cluster.
1.1  Game Model Assumptions
Assumption 1: There is a strong company B  and a 
weak company S . The strong company has developed a 
generic technology with the value V (V represents B ’s 
investment in this technology), denoting π(π＞V＞0) as 
the profit after its application. Furthermore, M and N  are 
the earnings of B and S . Generic technology can provide 
a wide range of potential application opportunities and is 
regarded as an important basic technology applying in the 
future specific products. And they will exert imperative 
impact on technological level and competitiveness of 
industries, thus enhancing the industrial competitiveness 
of a region or a country. So the government will award the 
successful development of generic technology. Here we 
assume K(π＞K＞0) as the government’s award for the 
successful development of a generic technology.
Assumption2: This game is a dynamic game with 
company S taking action first. There are three strategies: 
The first strategy is company S developing the generic 
technology by itself with a large amount of research and 
development investment. The second strategy is company 
S buying the generic technology from company B . 
The third strategy is company S signing a cooperative 
agreement with company B to take part in the development 
and application of the generic technology.
Assumption3: Let 1P represents the probability 
of success of company S when developing generic 
technology by itself. Let 2P  represents the probability 
of success of company S  when buying generic 
technology from company B and applying it. Let 3P  
( 1 2 31 0P P P> > > > )represents the probabili ty of 
success of company S  when signing a cooperative 
agreement with company B to take part in the development 
and apply the generic technology, and in this situation, 
company S  doesn’t need to pay the generic technology, 
but need to share profits after its successful application of 
the technology with company B , denoting f ( 0 1f< <
) as the sharing ratio of company S  and 1 f−  as the 
sharing ratio of company B . 
1.2  Game Model Construction
First, when company S  choose strategy one (developing 
the generic technology by itself with a large amount of 
research and development investment), its earning N  
isP1π+p1K, and company B ’s earning M is π+K. Second, 
when company S  choose strategy two (buying the 
generic technology from company B ), if company B
agree to sell the generic technology to company S , then 
company S ’s earning N  is P3πF, company B ’s earning 
M is  3 3P P f K V      ; if company B doesn’t 
agree to sell the generic technology to company S , then 
company S ’s earning N is  1 1P P K  ,  company B
’s earning M is π+K. Third, when company S  choose 
strategy three (signing a cooperative agreement with 
company B  to take part in the development and apply the 
generic technology), if company B  agree to cooperate 
with company S , then company S ’s earning N  is 3P f , 
company B ’s earning M is  3 3P P f K V      ;if 
company B doesn’t agree to cooperate with company S , 
then company S ’s earning N is  1 1P P K  , company B ’s 
earning M is π+K. In conclusion, this dynamic game can 
be expressed by the game tree as follows:
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                                        S ○  
develop by itself    not develop by itself  
[ 1 1P P K  , K  ]    ○  
                                     
Buy          cooperate  
B ○                 ○  B  
agree     not agree     agree    not  agree  
[ 2P V  , K V   ] [ 1 1P P K  , K  ] [ 3P f ,[ 1 1P P K  , K  ] 
                   3 3P P f K V      ] 
 
Figure 1
Game Tree of Diffusion of Generic Technology in Industry Cluster
According to Nash equilibrium:
max [ 2P V   ( 1 1P P K  )][ K V    ( K  )] 
max [ 3P f  ( 1 1P P K  )][ 3 3P P f     K 
V  ( K  )] 
Then solve the two terms above respectively, we get:
V  [( 2 1P P )  1P K ]/ 2  
f  [( 3 1P P ) 1P K  V ]/ 32P   
1.3  Game Model Analysis
First, compare strategy one and strategy three. Apparently, 
company S developing generic technology by itself is 
not a rational choice in any case because research and 
development of generic technology demands a large 
amount of capital, human resources and so on, and 
company S will assume more risks than company B while 
developing technology alone due to its weak strength 
of all aspects. All this make 1P very small. What’s more, 
company S ’s investment for successful research and 
development is much higher than government award. 
Therefore, generally speaking, as a rational company, 
company S will  not choose to develop a generic 
technology by itself.
Second, compare strategy two and strategy three. We 
can come to the conclusion that (purchase, agreement) 
is the optimal balance when [( 1P K V+ )/π] < ( 22P −
3 1P P− ) and (cooperation, agreement) is the optimal 
balance when [( 1P K V+ )/π] > ( 22P − 3P − 1P ).
For (purchase, agreement), company S will choose to 
buy the generic technology when its learning ability ( 2P
in this paper) is relatively strong and company B ’s selling 
price of generic technology (V in this paper) is relatively 
cheap. Generic technology in industry cluster can always 
be widely used in the cluster because it is microcosmic 
and basic, so small companies like company S in the 
cluster usually intend to buy the technology in order to 
promote its own development; large companies in the 
cluster also tend to buy the technology, for it is conductive 
to its research and development of more advanced 
technology and to some extent avoiding repeated 
development, which reduce the costs for developing more 
advanced technology. Therefore, as long as the selling 
price of the generic technology (V ) is proper, it is wise 
for company B to sell and diffuse the technology to gain 
the profits while it is wise for company S to buy the 
technology.
For (cooperation, agreement), industry cluster is 
considered to be a good platform for research and 
development and diffusion of generic technology, and 
developing the generic technology by cooperation is 
indeed a process of diffusing it. Developing the generic 
technology by cooperation can achieve economies 
of scale in research and development and diffusion, 
effectively disperse risks of research and development 
process, avoid repeated developing through different 
companies assuming different projects and make the 
negative externality internalized through cooperative 
development. Company S intends to cooperate with 
company B to develop the generic technology and 
apply it when its learning ability ( 2P in this paper) is 
relatively weak and company B ’s selling price of generic 
technology (V in this paper) is relatively expensive. And 
the research and development process can also be seen as 
the learning process of company S , which helps company 
S applying the technology more efficiently, thus gaining 
profits. Company B can obtain relatively big share after 
successful application of generic technology when f  is 
relatively low (1 f− is relatively high), meanwhile, it 
can also receive government award k  after successful 
development and diffuse and sell the generic technology 
to get other profits. Therefore, in this case, it is wise for 
company B to agree to cooperate with company S in the 
research and development of the technology, while it 
is wise for company S  to cooperate with company B to 
develop the technology.
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3.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROMOTE 
THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
A N D  D I F F U S I O N  O F  G E N E R I C 
TECHNOLOGY IN INDUSTRY CLUSTER
3.1  The Government Should Improve Relevant 
Laws and Regulations
There exist double failures of markets and organizations 
in the diffusion of the generic technology in industry 
cluster because of a series of characteristics of generic 
technology in cluster, which require the government 
to establish a series of laws and regulations, such as 
ameliorating related intellectual property rights, patent 
laws, contract laws, technology transfer laws and so on, 
to standardize and protect the innovation and diffusion 
process. At the same time, government should create a 
fair environment based on cooperation for competition 
and research and development and diffusion of generic 
technology in industry cluster. 
3.2  The Government Should Provide Appropriate 
Financial Supports
The government should offer companies in industry 
cluster developing and diffusing generic technology 
some referential policies like research and development 
funding and award, tax relief because of the high risk and 
investment of generic technology. Moreover, it should 
promote the cooperation between the financial institutions 
and companies in cluster, ensuring the efficient exchange 
of information between them, so that the financial 
institutions can choose to invest proper R&D projects of 
generic technology and are willing to bear risks with the 
companies who develop the generic technology. 
3.3  Large Companies in Cluster Should Give Full 
Play to its Advantages
Large companies in the cluster can make full use of 
its advantages, such as rich human resources, lots of 
funds and etc. to sign contract with small companies to 
cooperate with them in developing generic technology. 
In this way, first, they can obtain the government award 
after successful development and a part of profits from 
the small companies after the successful application of 
the generic technology. Second, they can elevate their 
figure through selling the generic technology to other 
companies both in the cluster and out of the cluster to get 
extra profits, thus promoting the future development of 
the company. Third, cooperating with other companies 
in developing the generic technology through different 
companies assuming different projects can avoid repeated 
investment and research and development, save time, 
and finally improve the efficiency of research and 
development.
3.4  Small Companies in Cluster Should Locate 
Themselves Rationally and Enhance Capabilities 
in All Aspects
On the one hand, small companies should choose to buy 
or cooperate with large companies based on their own 
levels according to their characteristics and technological 
capacities, so as to give full play to their own advantages. 
On the other hand, learn continuously, cultivate creative 
ability and fully aware of the importance of innovation and 
diffusion of generic technology to a company. Meanwhile, 
enhance learning and research and development abilities 
of the employees through education, training and other 
ways.
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